On 8 February
2009, almost 60 percent of Swiss voters supported the extension of the
bilateral EU-Switzerland agreement on the free movement of workers to workers
from Romania and Bulgaria. In this guest post, Roland Erne argues that this clear endorsement of the free movement
of Romanian and Bulgarian workers in the Swiss labour market is noteworthy
because the Swiss People Party (SVP) at the time conducted an overtly
xenophobic campaign against it, depicting Romanian and Bulgarian workers as
black ravens that were pecking on a map of Switzerland. Whereas xenophobic
inclinations may be a recurrent feature of humanity, xenophobia can hardly
explain the sudden shift of Swiss voters against the free movement of all EU
workers in the referendum of 9 February 2014; notably after a referendum
campaign in which the SVP – for once – avoided the use of xenophobic
stereotypes on its major campaign poster.
However, it
is also doubtful that the last Swiss vote in favour of migration controls can
be attributed to downward wage pressures in Switzerland’s low income sectors, as suggested by the Austrian
economist Schweighofer. The Swiss labour market is in part highly regulated which questions
economic textbook explanations of the Swiss vote that are predicated on
low-income workers’ apparently natural resistance against the free movement of
workers. Whereas unregulated labour migration certainly entail negative side
effects, as argued elsewhere regarding both sending (Stan and Erne 2013) and
receiving countries (Erne 2008), Swiss voters have accepted the free movement
of Romanian and Bulgarian workers in 2009, because Swiss trade unions
successfully fought for improved measures that aimed at preventing any abusive
undercutting of Swiss wage and employment conditions (Wyler 2012).
Photo by cavorite |
As during the earlier Swiss votes on the free movement of West European and Central and Eastern European workers in 2000 and 2005 respectively, trade unions, employer organisations, and government agreed improved ‘flanking measures’ in order to boost popular support for the opening of the Swiss labour marked to European migrant workers. Overall, the Swiss ‘flanking measures’ consist of acts and actions in the following three areas:
- A new Posted Workers Act that stipulates that workers transferred to Switzerland are subject to the wage and employment conditions which apply in Switzerland.
- A revised Act on the Extension of Collective Labour Agreements that facilitates the legal extension of collective agreements to all employers and employees operating in a given sector.
- Finally, the measures also included the setting up of tripartite commissions with extensive law enforcement powers composed of employer, union, and state representatives at the federal and cantonal levels in order to enforce the principle of equal wages for workers of different origins.
The flanking measures against the
abusive undercutting of local wage and employment conditions were particularly
effective in unionised low-wage sectors, where the measures facilitated the
extension of collective wage agreements by law, such as in the construction and
the hospitality industries. In order to enforce the equal pay principle for
local and migrant workers in the construction industry, for example, tripartite
commissions verified in 2010 the wages paid to 50% of all employees in the
sector. By contrast, however, the measures were much less effective in other
sectors of the economy – especially in services, retail, banking, but also
research and development – given the lack of effective corporatist
implementation mechanisms in these predominately non-unionised sectors.
We haven’t seen the results of any
detailed analysis of Swiss voting behaviour yet, but I wouldn’t be surprised if
the success of the Yes-vote could therefore be attributed to highly-paid
employees who are holding relatively cosmopolitan attitudes and hitherto
supported Switzerland’s opening to the EU, but aren’t working in sectors that
are effectively protected by the flanking measures. As mentioned by Rechsteiner and colleagues, Swiss high
earners’ fears of labour market competition from highly-skilled university
graduates from Switzerland’s neighbouring countries, namely Germany, have
played an important role in this year’s referendum campaign. This suggests,
however, that interpretations of the Swiss vote along the common divide between
(upper-class) cosmopolitansist and (working-class) nationalists – which is
dominating much of the current debate on Euro-skepticism – may be misleading.
The defeat of the No-campaign may indeed
be better explained by the limited sectorial scope of the flanking measures and
a gradual erosion of the class-compromise that hitherto had been sustaining
them. Consequently, neither the Liberals and Christian-Democrats nor the
Social-Democrats and Greens campaigned wholeheartedly against the SVP proposal.
On the one hand, employer organizations and the Liberal Party (FDP) prevented
any further strengthening of the flanking measures and their extension to new
policy areas. In a heated exchange with the leader of Social-Democratic Party
(SP), the FDP president justified his party’s refusal, by mentioning that the
point at which the regulatory costs of further ‘illiberal’ flanking measures
for businesses exceed the benefits from the bilateral agreements with the EU
had been reached (Müller 2014).
On the other hand, Social-Democratic
requests for an extension of the flanking measures beyond the labour market may
unintentionally also have played into the hands of the SVP. By demanding new
flanking measures in new policy areas – for instance, in order to combat
housing shortages and accelerated rent increases – the SP implicitly vindicated
SVP propaganda that was linking all ills caused by a capitalist economy to the
presence of migrant workers, as self-critically acknowledged by several
promoters of an ‘open and social’ Switzerland after the vote (Capus 2014, Kreis
2014).
In sum, the very different outcomes
of the Swiss votes on the free movement of EU workers over the past 10 years
show that EU integration referenda first and foremost reflect the intricate
socio-economic and political conjunctures in which the referendum debates took
place. These conjunctures, however, cannot be captured if one simply applies
the analytical models that are dominating present conventional wisdom, whether
they originate from textbook economics or culturalist identity politics.
Bibliography
Capus, A. (2014)
‚Rede zur Demonstration für eine offene und demokratische Schweiz vom 1. März
in Bern’ http://offen-und-solidarisch.ch/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Mediemappe.pdf
Erne, R.
(2008) European Unions. Labor’s Quest for a Transnational Democracy,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100323970
Kreis, G (2014)
‚Die Luft wird dünn‘ Tageswoche 4 (7) 6-9, http://www.tageswoche.ch/de/2014_07/schweiz/639841/die-luft-wird-duenn.htm
Müller, P.
(2014) Intervention during the party leaders’ debate. Swiss Television SFR 1, 9
February.
Stan, S. and
R. Erne (2014) ‘Explaining Romanian labor migration: from development gaps to
development trajectories’ Labor History, 55 (1) 21-46, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0023656X.2013.843841#.UxWvA3bKwjQ
Wyler, R. (2012) Schweizer
Gewerkschaften und Europa. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
This post was first published by the Social
Europe Journal on 6 March 2014 at http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/03/explain-swiss-vote-free-movement-workers-european-union/
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