The study shows that migration may also displace collective and egalitarian wage policies in favour of individual and marketized ones that put workers in competition with one another. Thus, the question is not so much whether migration leads to wage increases in sending countries, but whether unions’ wage demands in response to outward migration consolidate collective solidarity and coordination in wage policy-making or support its individualization and commodification.
Hence, migration is indeed far from being a mere factor in a virtuous
cycle of labour supply and demand. Migration is rather part and parcel of
global capitalism, with east-west migration more specifically being
constitutive of the EU enlargement project. This is also the case in
healthcare, where the integration of CEE healthcare sectors into global
capitalism has been conducted through a series of neoliberal reforms that have
accompanied the region’s integration into the EU. As part of a larger
privatizing drive, the aim has been to increase the involvement of private
actors and interests in the provision and funding of healthcare services by
attempting to disengage states from healthcare provision and funding,
introducing business-like models in the form of ‘new public management’ (NPM),
or directly encouraging the rise of private healthcare units and funding. These
measures have led to an increase in inequalities of access to services and in
the segmentation of the labour market in the sector, triggering in turn an
increase in healthcare worker out-migration. Migration and neoliberal
healthcare reforms are thus commonly imbricated in global capitalism, and
therefore play together, rather than separately, on union strategies.
The decentralization and the commodification of wage-setting
arrangements in CEE not only reflect the introduction of the new European
economic governance regime, but also herald a transformation of national labour
markets. This brings unions face to face with the crucial dilemma of either
pursuing egalitarian wage policies both across and inside sectors or engaging
in the neoliberal promotion of wage competition among workers as a tool of
‘equal opportunity’.
Under the conditions of austerity, the migration argument lost much of
its value as a factor for union power in CEE and led to a variety of union
responses. In Romania, austerity brought renewed attempts by governments to
privatize healthcare, continued outmigration and an attack on collective
bargaining institutions. In this changed context, the government not only
succeeded in weakening the capacity of Sanitas to act as a successful
bargaining agent, notwithstanding the relatively successful protest movement of
health care workers it initiated together with other professional organizations
in autumn 2013. The declining ability of Sanitas to enforce binding sectoral
wage norms also facilitated the rise of FSSR, which did not participate in the
2013 protests and which argues for individual, performance related pay systems
in response to individual workers’ ‘exit threats’.
As the current austerity policies accentuate the trend towards
neoliberal industrial relations regimes in CEE, the adoption of individual,
performance-related wage policies is likely to become a more prevalent response
to increased east-west labour migration than general, collective wage rises;
notably among unions that represent professions and grades particularly
affected by east-west labour migration. In a larger perspective, it may thus
not only be true that decreased overall union power leads to higher wage
inequalities, but also that some unions actively contribute to legitimate, if
not directly accelerate, this trend.
The study on which this blog is based has been published in the European
Journal of Industrial Relations. It is part of Stan and Erne’s contribution
to the Transnational
Labour Project in Oslo, 2013/14:
Stan, S. and Erne, R. 2015. Is migration from Central and
Eastern Europe an opportunity for trade unions to demand higher wages? Evidence
from the Romanian health sector, European
Journal of Industrial Relations, 1-17. Published online, 18 October. DOI:
10.1177/0959680115610724
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